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Commentaries/Commentaires
“The Normal Ones Take Time”: Civil
Commitment and Sexual Assault in R. v
Alsadi
Isabel Grant
“Power and its use or abuse are pivotal issues in both sexual assault and
institutionalization.”
1
Introduction
Women with mental disabilities are subject to sexual assault at a significantly
higher rate than other women.
2
Yet there is a surprising paucity of case law involving
The author would like to thank Laura DeVries and Brendan Ward for their research assistance on this
comment. Thanks also to Janine Benedet, Joanna Birenbaum, and Sonia Lawrence for their helpful
comments. Special thanks to Laura Johnston whose research assistance and thoughtful insights about
this project have enriched my understanding and improved this comment. The title’s quotation comes
from the accused’s response when asked whether he often had sex with women he had known for
only fifteen minutes. Cited in R v Alsadi, 2012 BCCA 183, [2012] BCJ No 826 at para 37 (xiv)
(Factum of the Appellant).
1. Maureen Crossmaker, “Behind Locked Doors: Institutional Sexual Abuse” (1991) 9 Sexuality and
Disability 201 at 201.
2. I use the term “mental disability” in this paper to include psychiatric, developmental, neurological,
and other related disabilities that impair cognitive, emotional, or perceptual functioning. This term
is used in the equality guarantees of section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 11,
and various human rights statutes. The most often cited data on the incidence of sexual assault
against women with mental disabilities is primarily from the 1990s. See, for example, Roeher
Institute, No More Victims: A Manual to Guide Counselors and Social Workers in Addressing
the Sexual Abuse of People with a Mental Handicap (North York: Roeher Institute, 1992) at 25;
Roeher Institute, Harm’s Way: The Many Faces of Violence and Abuse against Persons with
Disabilities (North York: Roeher Institute, 1995) at 9; Dick Sobsey, Violence and Abuse in the
Lives of People with Disabilities: The End of Silent Acceptance? (Baltimore, MD: Paul H
Brookes, 1994) at 69; Michelle McCarthy, Sexuality and Women with Learning Disabilities
(London: Jessica Kingsley, 1999) at 29-30. More recent data often fails to distinguish between
mental and physical disability. See, for example, Douglas A Brownridge, “Partner Violence
against Women with Disabilities: Prevalence, Risk, and Explanations” (2006) 12 Violence
against Women 805; but see Sandra L Martin et al, “Physical and Sexual Assault of Women
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women with mental disabilities as complainants. One can only assume that women
with mental disabilities are sexually assaulted much more often than their assailants
are prosecuted.
3
While the subject of this comment, R. v Alsadi, presents an unusual
fact situation, the issues that it raises go to the core of our understanding of what it
means to “voluntarily agree” to engage in sexual activity with another person
when there is a profound imbalance of power between the two individuals.
4
The doctrine of consent has been at the centre of sexual assault law for many
decades. Yet there was no statutory definition until 1992 when section 273.1(1) of
the Criminal Code was enacted, defining consent as the “voluntary agreement to
engage in the sexual activity in question.”
5
It was not until 1999 that a focus on
the complainant’s perspective of whether she wanted the sexual activity to take
place was integrated into the fabric of our law.
6
Janine Benedet and I have argued
elsewhere that the current understanding of consent and the focus on what the com-
plainant was thinking at the time, while positive for many women, has been proble-
matic for some women with mental disabilities, in part because it fails to incorporate
into the definition of consent the factors of sexual exploitation and coercion that are
so pervasive in these women’s lives.
7
No case demonstrates this better than Alsadi.
The Criminal Code has at least two provisions that are particularly relevant for
sexual assaults involving complainants with mental disabilities. Section 153.1 of
the Criminal Code creates an offence of sexual exploitation of a person with a dis-
ability when the accused is in a position of trust or authority with respect to the
person with a disability and he counsels or incites that person into sexual touching
without consent.
8
Section 273.1(2)(c) provides that no consent is obtained where
the complainant was induced to engage in the activity by abuse of a relationship
of trust, power, or authority.
9
This provision is general and not limited to persons
with Disabilities” (2006) 12 Violence against Women 823, which does address the increased
incidence of sexual assault against women with cognitive disabilities in North Carolina.
3. One study showed that only half of women who experienced sexual assault in a psychiatric facility
reported that assault. D Hawthorne, A McKenzie and J Dawson, Critical Admissions: A Study of
Family Violence, Physical and Sexual Abuse in a Psychiatric Inpatient Population (Melbourne,
Australia: Institute of Psychiatric Nursing Research, Royal Park Hospital, 1996), as cited in
Haley Clark and Bianca Fileborn, “Responding to Women’s Experiences of Sexual Assault in
Institutional and Care Settings” (2011) 10 Australian Centre for the Study of Sexual Assault
Wrap, online: Australian Institute of Family Studies ,http://www.aifs.gov.au/acssa/pubs/
wrap/wrap10/w10.pdf. at 6 .
4. R v Alsadi (27 July 2011), Case no 213734-2-C, Vancouver (BC Prov Ct) [Alsadi trial judgment]. R
v Alsadi, 2012 BCCA 183, [2012] BCJ no 826 at para 2 [Alsadi Court of Appeal].
5. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 273.1(2)(b), as amended by An Act to Amend the Criminal
Code (Sexual Assault), SC 1992, c 38, s 1 [Criminal Code].
6. R v Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 SCR 330 [Ewanchuk].
7. See Janine Benedet and Isabel Grant, “Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women with
Mental Disabilities: Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief” (2007) 52 McGill Law Journal
243; and Janine Benedet and Isabel Grant, “A Situational Approach to Incapacity and Mental
Disability in Sexual Assault Law” (2012) 43(1) Ottawa Law Review [forthcoming].
8. Criminal Code, supra note 5 at s 153.1.
9. Ibid at s 271(1).
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with disabilities. Both of these sections were at issue in Alsadi. The accused was
charged under section 153.1, but this charge was virtually subsumed by the
sexual assault charge and will not be the subject of this comment.
10
The focus in
this comment will be on the approach taken to section 273.1(2)(c) and its relation-
ship to the doctrine of voluntariness. This comment will demonstrate that, in Alsadi,
section 273.1(2)(c) was applied in a manner that has the potential to exclude many
women with mental disabilities from its protection.
The comment argues that, in general, many courts are not taking the correct
approach to the relationship between consent and section 273.1(2)(c) and, more
specifically, that even if the accused’s evidence was accepted in its entirety in
Alsadi, there were no factual findings that could have led to a finding of voluntary
consent and thus an acquittal. While the easiest way to reach this result would have
been through the proper application of section 273.1(2)(c), the same result could
have been reached through an analysis of voluntariness. The abuse of “trust,
power or authority” is one specific way in which an agreement to engage in
sexual activity is not voluntary. Where there is a significant power imbalance, it
is essential that courts go beyond whether there was a simple “yes” to sexual
activity and consider whether that yes was free from coercion.
In Alsadi, the accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual exploitation of
a person with a disability.
11
The complainant was a forty-nine-year-old woman who
was hospitalized in the psychiatric ward at Vancouver General Hospital. The British
Columbia Court of Appeal described her as having had schizophrenia for almost
thirty years, although the evidence at trial was that she had schizoaffective disorder
and bipolar disorder.
12
She had been hospitalized over twenty times throughout her
adult life
13
and had been labelled as one of the “highest needs individuals” within
the health region.
14
On this admission to hospital, she had been involuntarily com-
mitted under the British Columbia Mental Health Act.
15
Mr. Alsadi was a uni-
formed security guard on duty in the hospital. The complainant met the accused
10. Alsadi trial judgment, supra note 4, is a reminder that section 153.1 of the Criminal Code, which
was enacted to provide additional protection from sexual abuse for persons with disabilities by
persons in positions of trust or authority, is essentially worthless. Since the section has a non-
consent requirement, in order to prosecute successfully the Crown must prove the crime of
sexual assault plus the additional elements that the complainant had a disability and that the
accused was in a position of trust or authority. In other words, the section provides no
additional protection over the broader crime of sexual assault and, given that section 153.1 has
a lower penalty, its usefulness is doubtful. It could be argued, in fact, that this section portrays
persons with disabilities as “others” rather than as very frequent victims of sexual assault. See
Benedet and Grant, “Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief,” supra note 7, where the authors
demonstrate that there have been very few successful prosecutions under this section.
11. Alsadi trial judgment, supra note 4. Criminal Code, supra note 5, ss 153.1, 271(1).
12. Alsadi Court of Appeal, supra note 4 at para 2. For the evidence at trial, see R v Alsadi, 2012
BCCA 183, [2012] BCJ No 826 (Factum of the Appellant) at para 14 [Alsadi Crown appellant
factum].
13. Alsadi Crown appellant factum, supra note 12 at para 2.
14. Ibid at para 4.
15. Mental Health Act, RSBC 1996, c 288.
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when she was off the ward having a cigarette. He approached her, they talked, and
then they kissed. He persuaded her to go into a day room, which he accessed using
his keys and/or knowledge of the alarm system. Over the next ten to twelve
minutes, sexual activity, including oral sex, took place.
The complainant testified in detail how the accused forced her to engage in oral
sex with him. She made it clear that she had not wanted the sexual activity to take
place and that she wanted to return to the ward.
16
The accused, by contrast, painted
her as the sexual aggressor. He admitted that he was aware at the time that she was a
psychiatric patient, but he claimed that she was not “jumping around and acting
crazy.”
17
He did not think he needed to make any inquiries about why she was hos-
pitalized or whether she was on medication because she looked normal. However,
he conceded that he had been trained that psychiatric patients were likely to be on
medication and may well appear “normal.”
18
He was also a former nurse and thus
would have known that anti-psychotic medication is more likely to induce sedation
than to make someone “jump around.” He admitted that the complainant did not
want to go into the day room with him but that he persuaded her to do so
because he was concerned about being seen. He also admitted knowing that he
was risking his job by engaging in sexual activity with the complainant.
19
The Trial Judgment: Reinvigorating Stereotypes
The trial judge found that the complainant was the sexual aggressor and,
therefore, that the Crown had failed to prove non-consent. He then went on to con-
clude that the accused was not in a position of trust, power, or authority with respect
to the complainant. The trial judge relied on numerous myths and stereotypes about
women with mental disabilities and sexual assault generally in arriving at his find-
ings of fact.
20
We are told in the second paragraph of the judgment that the com-
plainant had “impulsive sexual encounters,”
21
a characterization that is commonly
made about women with mental disabilities, impermissibly bringing in sexual
history evidence contrary to section 276 of the Criminal Code.
22
The trial judge
16. Whether the complainant wanted the sexual activity to take place is the test for the actus reus of
non-consent set out in Ewanchuk, supra note 6 at paras 24-7.
17. Alsadi trial judgment, supra note 4 at para 28.
18. Ibid at para 29.
19. Ibid at para 30.
20. For a discussion of the history of stereotyping in sexual assault prosecutions, see Emma Cunliffe,
“Sexual Assault Cases in the SCC: Losing Sight of Substantive Equality?” (2012) Supreme Court
Law Review [forthcoming]. Cunliffe persuasively argues that “substantive equality reasoning has
not yet infused judicial approaches to fact determination in sexual assault cases, and that
individual complainants are not yet fully protected against the operation of myths and
stereotypes when consent or credibility are at stake.”
21. Alsadi trial judgment, supra note 4 at para 2.
22. See, for example, R v Harper, 2002 YKSC 18, [2002] YJ No 38 [Harper]; and R v BM, [1994] OJ
No 2242 (Ct J (Prov Div)). For a discussion of the misuse of sexual history evidence, see Janine
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expressed concern that there was no evidence to corroborate her claim that she was
forced to go into the day room and made note of the fact that the nurse who exam-
ined her found no physical evidence of injuries to her breasts.
23
This reasoning
seems to reinvent a corroboration requirement to sexual assault that has been statu-
torily abandoned.
24
Similarly, the judge expressed concern that she did not report the assault to a
group of security guards she met shortly after the sexual activity, and, in fact,
those guards indicated that she seemed to be calm. This comment relies on the dis-
carded notion that women who are sexually assaulted must immediately raise a hue
and cry to the first people they encounter.
25
There was no discussion of the impact
of anti-psychotic medication on the complainant’s mood or appearance nor of
whether a woman would feel safe reporting an assault to the colleagues of her
alleged assailant. The trial judge ultimately accepted the accused’s evidence in
full, concluding that the complainant was a willing participant and, in fact, the
aggressor throughout all of the sexual activity.
While the complainant’s sexual history was open for consideration, the trial
judge gave little weight to the fact that the accused had been warned about “inap-
propriate conduct” with patients in the past while on duty and that he had been fired
from his position as a nurse for having a sexual relationship with a visitor to the
hospital.
26
In fact, the trial judge’s reasons give the impression that the accused
was the victim of a sexually aggressive woman and that the allegations devastated
the life of a young security guard, husband, and father.
27
Benedet and Isabel Grant, “Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women with Mental
Disabilities: Evidentiary and Procedural Issues” (2007) 52 McGill Law Journal 515 at 532-7.
23. Alsadi trial judgment, supra note 4 at para 38.
24. Historically, the testimony of victims of sexual assault (especially women with mental disabilities)
was considered untrustworthy and required corroboration. The mandatory corroboration rule
required a jury to disregard the evidence of certain witnesses (for example, “children of tender
years” and “female idiots”) in sexual assault cases without further corroborating evidence. See
Jeffrey G Hoskins, “The Rise and Fall of the Corroboration Rule in Sexual Offence Cases”
(1983-5) 4 Canadian Journal of Family Law 173. Mandatory corroboration for incest, gross
indecency, sexual assault, sexual assault with a weapon, and aggravated sexual assault was
repealed by An Act to Amend the Criminal Code in Relation to Sexual Offences and Other
Offences against the Person and to Amend Certain Other Acts in Relation thereto or in
Consequence thereof, SC 1980-81-82-83, c 125 [Sexual Offences Act]. See Criminal Code,
supra note 5 at s 274.
25. It was a well-established common law notion that a woman was expected to complain about sexual
assault at the earliest possible opportunity and a lack of such complaint was taken as a self-
contradiction of her story. See, for instance, R v Kribs, [1960] SCR 400; R v Timms, [1981] 2
SCR 315. This rule was abrogated by Sexual Offences Act, supra note 24. See Criminal Code,
supra note 5 at s 275.
26. Alsadi trial judgment, supra note 4 at para 65. Alsadi Crown appellant factum, supra note 12 at
para 37 (xiii) (involving evidence and cross-examination of the respondent).
27. For example, the trial judge stated, in the Alsadi trial judgment, supra note 4 at para 67: “There is
no question in my mind he had [sic] paid dearly already, not just financially, psychologically,
emotionally, but socially as well, as a result of his extremely foolish actions on the day in
question.”
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After finding consent, the trial judge went on to consider whether her consent was
induced by the accused “abusing a position of trust, power or authority.”
28
Here, the
trial judgment becomes unclear. The judge focused almost entirely on the scope of
the accused’s legal authority as a security guard. He acknowledged that the
accused was in a position of authority in that he had the power to “enforce obedience”
or “influence the conduct and actions” of those using the hospital.
29
However, he
found that when he met the complainant, the accused was conducting a routine
patrol of the hospital and, at that particular time, he would not have had the authority
to restrain the activities of the complainant.
30
This finding seems to contradict his
earlier acknowledgement that, at the request of nursing staff, security guards do get
involved in restraining patients and in taking action if a patient leaves the hospital.
31
The trial judge’s analysis of whether Alsadi was in a position of trust, power, or
authority was also marred by consideration of factors not relevant to the case. For
example, he noted that the complainant was older than the accused, as if this fact
reduced his power over her.
32
More problematically, the trial judge noted that the
relationship between the complainant and the accused only lasted fifteen minutes
and that “[g]iven that short period of time, it appears improbable that any sort of
trust, authority or relationship dependency to be developed [sic] between the
parties.”
33
One can infer from this statement that the more quickly Alsadi acted,
and the less time he took to get to know the complainant before having sex with
her, the more likely her apparent agreement would be upheld as consent.
The trial judge went on to conclude that the purpose of section 273.1(2)(c) is to
deal with situations where the complainant does not know she has a right to refuse
or fears reprisal if she does. In this case, he found that the evidence was that the
complainant knew she had a right to refuse. His finding that she was the sexual
aggressor permeated the entire judgment. He concluded that her participation had
nothing to do with the security guard/patient relationship, and, therefore, there
was no evidence that an abuse of trust, power, or authority had induced consent.
The clear implication was that the complainant would have been willing to have
sex with anyone she met on the grounds.
The relationship of trust, power, or authority in this case comes from the imbal-
ance of power that existed between the accused and the complainant because of her
vulnerable position as a woman who was civilly committed in a psychiatric facility
28. Criminal Code, supra note 5 at s 273.1(2)(c).
29. Alsadi trial judgment, supra note 4 at para 50.
30. This is a puzzling finding of fact. If Alsadi had been asked for help restraining the patient at that
time, or asked to call police if a civilly committed patient left the hospital, it is unlikely that he
would have said: “I can’t do that, I am on a routine patrol.”
31. Whether the complainant was aware of these distinctions in a security guard’s power based on the
particular activity in which he is engaged was not addressed by the trial judge.
32. The trial judge was led to this conclusion based on cases dealing with the abuse of power between
the teacher and a student where the age differential is part of the imbalance of power. See R v
Audet, [1996] 2 SCR 171.
33. Alsadi trial judgment, supra note 4 at para 54.
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and his powerful position as a uniformed security guard on duty in that hospital. The
fact that he abused her quickly does not negate this power but, rather, only highlights
its force. When asked in cross-examination whether he often had oral sex with
women whom he had known for fifteen minutes, the accused responded, “[t]he
normal ones take time,” revealing the extent to which he sought out a vulnerable
victim for quick, easy sexual activity for which he would not be held accountable.
34
The British Columbia Court of Appeal: A Step Forward but a Step
Short
The Crown appealed this decision to the British Columbia Court of Appeal,
which quashed the acquittal and ordered a new trial.
35
The court held that the trial
judge had misdirected himself in assessing whether the accused was in a position of
trust, power, or authority. The court found that the trial judge erred in focusing on
the scope of the accused’s authority and the fact that the complainant was a willing
participant, rather than examining whether he induced consent through an abuse of
a position of trust, power, or authority over the complainant.
There is much to praise in the Court of Appeal’s judgment. It held that no coercion
is necessary under this section and that “the use of the word ‘induces’ introduces a
more subtle form of pressure that can be inferred from the circumstances of the exer-
cise of the power or authority.”
36
The court explicitly disagreed with the trial judge
that the fact that the accused could not have restrained the activities of the complai-
nant at that particular time was relevant. It also rejected the suggestion that the fact the
complainant was older than the accused was relevant. Its response to this assertion
was simply put: “The complainant was a psychiatric patient.”
37
Finally, the court rejected the idea that the short nature of their relationship was
relevant to whether he was in a position of trust, power, or authority over the com-
plainant, instead concluding that “such a relationship would be inherent and not
dependent on the length of contact between the parties.”
38
The court further clari-
fied that the issue was not whether the complainant misapprehended her right to
refuse the sexual advances or did not understand that she could say no but,
rather, whether the accused induced the complainant to participate by abusing a
position of trust, power, or authority.
34. Alsadi Crown appellant factum, supra note 12 at para 37 (xiv) (involving evidence and cross-
examination of the respondent). Even acknowledging that English was a second language for
the accused, this response in cross-examination still reveals a disturbing attitude towards
women. All women are reduced to how much effort it takes to persuade them to engage in
sexual activity. One can speculate that the accused targeted the complainant as a woman with
an easily exploitable disability.
35. Alsadi Court of Appeal, supra note 4 at para 36.
36. Ibid at para 19, citing R v Makayak, 2004 NUCJ 5 (available on CanLII) at para 70 [Makayak].
37. Ibid at para 22.
38. Ibid.
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The court also noted that the trial judge should have made a finding on the position
of trust and on the position of power, which are each distinct from the inquiry into
authority.
39
However, the court refused the Crown’s request to enter a conviction
and chose to send the case back for a new trial to determine whether the accused
induced consent by abusing his position of trust, power, or authority. This decision
means that the Crown must prove that the complainant only agreed to sex because
of the abuse of trust, power, or authority. In other words, the court held that a
finding of consent was open to the trial judge, separate and apart from the accused’s
position of trust, power, or authority over the complainant. In my view, this was the
critical error in the case. Even on the facts most favourable to the accused, conviction
was the only appropriate outcome.
Analysis
The Context of Civil Commitment
In Alsadi, the trial judge did not mention that the complainant was civilly com-
mitted and the Court of Appealmentioned it only once in passing.While the record was
unclear as to whether the accused knew the complainant’s status, as a security guard he
would have known that some psychiatric patients are involuntarily detained, as one of
his duties was to contact police if a patient left the hospital without permission. There
was no suggestion that he made any inquires in this regard. The legal issues in this case
should not have been addressed in the absence of a consideration of this context.
One of the tragedies of mental illness is that sexual abuse is both a contributing
cause and a result of being labelled mentally ill.
40
Maureen Crossmaker explains the
powerlessness that contributes to both mental illness and sexual assault:
For many people, living with the label of . . . [mental illness] means econ-
omic deprivation; little credibility, powerlessness, and being reinforced for
compliant behavior; dependence on others for the meeting of basic needs,
others making decisions in their “best interests”; lack of access to resources
and information more readily available to the general public; all are factors
with the potential to increase the risk of sexual victimization.
41
These issues are particularly problematic for women in an institutional setting.
42
A strange paradox is presented. On the one hand, women in institutions are
39. Ibid at paras 29-34.
40. “Not only have women with prior sexual abuse histories tended to find themselves in institutions,
they have also frequently been sexually abused while housed within institutions.” Clark and
Fileborn, supra note 3 at 4.
41. Crossmaker, supra note 1 at 204 [citations omitted].
42. It is very difficult to get clear evidence on the incidence of sexual assault in institutions. The
General Social Survey on Victimization conducted by Statistics Canada, for example, excludes
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expected to be asexual, and, thus, any expression of sexuality is often labelled as
inappropriate.
43
At the same time, women in institutions are in danger of sexual
assault from other residents,
44
staff members,
45
and visitors.
46
They are sexually
assaulted in part because they have been labelled mentally ill, and their allegations
of assault are not believed for the same reason:
The legacy of women’s historical relationship with institutions, deviance
and madness—and the power of institutional discourse to construct under-
standings of both deviance and madness—has been particularly proble-
matic in relation to women’s experiences of sexual abuse. Being
constructed as prone to mental disorder has played a significant role in
allowing women’s disclosures of sexual assault to be dismissed or disbe-
lieved, or viewed as a symptom of one’s “disorder” to be responded to
with medical intervention. Psychiatric discourses have at times explicitly
labelled women’s disclosures of sexual abuse to be the product of their dis-
ordered mind, most infamously promoted through the work of Freud.
47
It takes enormous courage for a woman in a psychiatric ward to complain of sexual
assault, particularly when the alleged assailant is a hospital employee. A culture of
silence, power, and fear make it particularly difficult to report.
48
Compliance, rather
than resistance, is rewarded in this institutional context. As Crossmaker notes,
the people on the lowest rung of the institutional ladder—the residents—
are reinforced for compliant behavior, economically, physically and psy-
chologically dependent, isolated and lacking in credibility; all factors
increasing vulnerability to sexual assault.
49
respondents living in institutions. See Samuel Perreault and Shannon Brennan, “Criminal
Victimization in Canada, 2009” (2010) 30:2 Juristat, online: Statistics Canada ,http://www.
statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2010002/article/11340-eng.pdf.. As Clark and Fileborn explain,
supra note 3 at 5, in the Australian context, “[t]here are significant barriers to measuring the
extent of sexual assault histories within institutions . . . [W]omen face myriad obstacles to
recognising and disclosing sexual assault, and sexual offences are not always systematically
recorded. Institutional populations are generally excluded from major data collections, such as
ABS household surveys, while the International Violence Against Women Survey (IVAWS)
specifically excluded women with an illness or disability from the survey sample. Surveys
often do not include questions that systematically address sexual assault that occurs in
institutions. Despite constraints on identifying and measuring the full extent of sexual assault
among institutional populations, research from a number of sources indicates that victimisation
is widespread” [citations omitted].
43. See, for example, Harper, supra note 22; and Clark and Fileborn, supra note 3.
44. Clark and Fileborn, supra note 3.
45. People v Thompson, 142 Cal App (4th) 1426, 48 Cal Rptr 3d 803 (Cal App 2006).
46. Harper, supra note 22.
47. Clark and Fileborn, supra note 3 at 4 [citations omitted].
48. Crossmaker, supra note 1.
49. Ibid at 205.
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In fact, it is likely that after the complainant in Alsadi reported the alleged assault,
she was confined to the ward and her privileges reduced, albeit under the guise of
her own protection.
There is no exercise of state authority more extraordinary and complete than that
of civil commitment. This is particularly true in a province such as British
Columbia, where civil commitment carries with it a near certainty of forced psy-
chiatric treatment with powerful medications that can profoundly alter one’s experi-
ence of the world.
50
A civilly committed woman’s relationship to her caregivers and
those responsible for her custody is characterized by a profound imbalance of
power. She has lost all control over her liberty and over the security of her
person. She is not free to leave the hospital and could be apprehended by police
if she tried to leave.
51
She cannot leave the ward, use the telephone, wear her
own clothes, or go for a cigarette without the permission of her medical team.
Security guards play a role in enforcing these rules. After twenty hospitalizations,
the complainant in Alsadi would have been well aware of this fact.
The most immediate analogy that comes to mind is that of a prisoner and her
jailer.
52
However, even the prisoner has significantly more rights than the individual
who has been civilly committed. The prisoner has a right to be brought before a
judge within twenty-four hours and the right to be released on bail in most circum-
stances.
53
The prisoner has the right to legal representation and access to legal aid if
she cannot afford it. If convicted, the prisoner will almost certainly face a determi-
nant sentence that will have a clear end based on the nature of the crime she has
committed.
In contrast, the civilly committed psychiatric patient in British Columbia can be
detained for up to a month on the word of two doctors, neither of whom must be a
psychiatrist and only one of whom must have examined her.
54
She will have a right
to have her detention reviewed by an administrative tribunal at some point within
the first thirty days, although legal aid will not cover the cost of a lawyer. If she
is fortunate, she will have a paralegal providing assistance, although she may
50. Mental Health Act, supra note 15 at s 31.
51. Ibid at s 41.
52. Canadian courts have had no difficulty finding an abuse of power or authority in the prison
context. See R v Greenhalgh, 2011 BCSC 511, [2011] BCJ No 745, where the accused was a
border services officer who strip-searched several women (with their apparent permission) but
was found guilty of sexual assault on the basis that the consent was invalid because the
accused abused a position of trust. See also Makayak, supra note 36, where the complainant
was detained in a jail cell being guarded by the accused. The court held that even if consent to
sexual activity were established, it would have been negated by his abuse of power and
authority. See also Katherine C Parker, “Female Inmates Living in Fear: Sexual Abuse by
Correctional Officers in the District Of Columbia” (2002) 10 American University Journal of
Gender, Social Policy and the Law 443.
53. Criminal Code, supra note 5 at s 503(1) and s 515(1)(a). Where a justice is not available within
twenty-four hours, the individual must be taken before a justice as soon as possible.
54. See Mental Health Act, supra note 15 at ss 22, 23. See Mullins v Levy, 2009 BCCA 6.
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have to delay her hearing to get that help.
55
Subject to her right to an administrative
hearing, a person who is civilly committed can be held indefinitely if her detention
is renewed periodically by her physician.
56
The civilly committed individual will
almost certainly be medicated, regardless of her wishes, which leaves her particu-
larly vulnerable to sexual assault. My point is not to contrast the powerlessness
of prisoners and civilly committed individuals but, rather, to suggest that the coer-
cion in the prison context is more explicit and, thus, more easily recognizable than
in the civil commitment context where the state coercion is masked by concerns
about the “best interests” of the patient. The relative absence of legal rights in
the civil commitment context highlights this obfuscation of the exercise of state
coercion.
It is within this context that the following legal analysis of voluntariness and
abuse of “trust, power, and authority” must be considered. This comment does
not purport to present a comprehensive analysis of these issues for sexual assault
law generally but, rather, argues that their interpretation must be assessed in the
context of a woman with a significant psychiatric disability who is detained and
medicated without her consent.
Section 273.1(1): The Meaning of Voluntary Agreement
Section 273.1(1) of the Criminal Code defines consent for the purposes of
sexual assault as the “voluntary agreement” of the complainant to engage in the
sexual activity in question. There are remarkably few cases on the meaning of
voluntariness, perhaps because many of them get subsumed by the more specific
provisions in section 273.1(2). The leading voluntariness case is R. v Stender,
where the accused threatened that he would circulate nude photographs of the com-
plainant (his former girlfriend) engaged in sex acts if she did not have sex with
him.
57
She submitted to his threats, and he was charged with sexual assault. The
Crown argued that the accused abused a position of power and, therefore, that
consent was vitiated. The trial judge found that, while the accused abused his
power, it was not the kind of relationship Parliament intended to criminalize, and
thus the accused was acquitted. The Ontario Court of Appeal, in quashing the
acquittal, held that it was not necessary to get to the abuse of power issue
55. Ibid ss 24, 25.
56. Ibid s 24. Section 33 of the Mental Health Act provides for a rarely used and even more rarely
successful avenue of judicial review of detention. See section 33(5)(b), which provides that
evidence that the patient may fail to follow the treatment plan of her physicians may in itself
be sufficient to deny a remedy even where the statutory criteria for commitment cannot be
established.
57. R v Stender, [2005] 1 SCR 914, 2005 SCC 36; R v DS, [2004] OJ No 3440 (sub nom R v S(DG)),
72 OR (3d) 223 (CA) [Stender CA]. Voluntariness is also discussed in R v Matheson, [1999] OJ
No 1320, 44 OR (3d)557 (CA), in the context of a psychologist who had sex with two of his
patients.
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because the trial judge did not make a finding that the complainant’s agreement to
participate in sex was voluntary. In going straight to the issue of power and auth-
ority, the trial judge “misconceived the threshold question for determination,
namely, whether [the complainant] consented to sexual intercourse with the respon-
dent at all.”
58
Stender demonstrates that mere agreement is not enough and that the
agreement has to be the result of a free choice. It also extends the potential for in-
voluntariness beyond situations involving a threat of physical force.
Phyllis Coleman suggests a power imbalance in a relationship has the potential to
negate voluntariness:
The . . . reason that consent is suspect is that it may be the result of an
implicit or explicit threat creating an apparent inability to reject the
sexual advances of the powerful person. In these situations, the ostensible
consent is involuntary and should be legally ineffective.
59
Voluntariness was not addressed by either the trial judge or the Court of Appeal in
Alsadi. The trial judge’s finding that the complainant was the sexual aggressor and
an active participant throughout all stages of the sexual activity involved a virtual
presumption of voluntariness. The findings of fact in Stender were more conducive
to a conclusion that the agreement to have sex was involuntary. There was no doubt
that the complainant did not want to have sex with the accused, and the accused’s
threats in Stender were explicit. In Alsadi, the complainant’s claim that she did not
want sex to take place was disbelieved and any threat unspoken. Nonetheless, the
trial judge should have addressed whether her apparent agreement (which she
denied) was free from coercion.
Stender demonstrates how the relationship between the parties and the power the
accused has over the complainant is central to the voluntariness analysis and that a
finding of involuntariness can still be made if the relationship in question does not
fall within section 273.1(2)(c).
60
In explaining a lack of voluntariness, the Ontario
Court of Appeal in Stender cites from cases dealing specifically with an abuse of
power, trust, or authority. There is thus a clear connection between the doctrine
of voluntariness and the Criminal Code provision negating consent where there
has been an abuse of trust, power, or authority, to which I now turn.
Section 273.1(2): Trust, Power, and Authority
While section 273.1(1) defines consent as voluntary agreement, section
273.1(2) sets out a number of specific ways in which the requirement of voluntary
58. Stender CA, supra note 57 at para 47.
59. Phyllis Coleman, “Sex in Power Dependency Relationships: Taking Unfair Advantage of the
‘Fair’ Sex” (1988-9) 53 Albany Law Review 95 at 97.
60. Stender CA, supra note 57 at para 58.
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agreement is not met. There are different kinds of factors listed in subsections (a)-
(e) such as incapacity to consent (subsection (b)) and where the complainant
expresses non-consent (subsection (d)). According to section 273.1(2)(c) of the
Criminal Code, no consent is obtained if the accused induced the complainant to
engage in the sexual activity through the abuse of a relationship of trust, power,
or authority. The Que´bec Court of Appeal has provided one of the leading state-
ments of the impact of authority on consent in a case involving a psychiatrist
charged with sexual assault after having sex with two of his patients:
[C]onsent implies a reasonably informed choice, freely exercised. No such
choice has been exercised where a person engages in sexual activity as a
result of fraud, force, fear, or violence. Nor is the consent requirement satis-
fied if, because of his or her mental state, one of the parties is incapable of
understanding the sexual nature of the act, or of realizing that he or she
may choose to decline participation. “Consent” is thus stripped of its defin-
ing characteristics when it is applied to the submission, non-resistance,
non-objection, or even the apparent agreement, of a deceived, unconscious
or compelled will.
61
This passage demonstrates the close relationship between voluntariness and a viola-
tion of a position of trust or authority. Section 273.1(2)(c) can be seen as one
specific example of circumstances in which an agreement is not voluntary.
The case law on this section is not entirely clear on its requirements. Some courts
have held that the mere fact of the relationship itself is not sufficient to trigger the
section and that there must be an abuse
62
or misuse
63
of that relationship. Yet other
cases imply that the abuse may be inherent in some relationships and, thus, that
sexual activity may be in itself abusive. In R. v Hogg, the accused was a drug
dealer who allegedly gave a drug-addicted woman drugs in exchange for sex.
The Ontario Court of Appeal stated:
I have no doubt that . . . [section 273.1(c)] could have application to the
relationship between a drug dealer and an addicted client. However, the
relationship is not one of an imbalance of power per se. This is not a
case of a position of authority or trust, such as in the prototypic doctor/
patient, teacher/student relationship, where vulnerability is inherent to
the relationship itself.
64
61. R v St-Laurent, [1994] RJQ 69, 90 CCC (3d) 291 at 311, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 23982 (4
February 1994).
62. R v FL, 2009 ONCA 813, [2009] OJ No 4839.
63. R v Lutoslawski, 2010 ONCA 207, [2010] OJ No 1094, aff’d 2010 SCC 49, [2010] 3 SCR 60
[Lutoslawski].
64. R v Hogg, 148 CCC (3d) 86 (sub nom R v AH), [2000] OJ No 3258 (ONCA) at para 17.
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The Court of Appeal in Alsadi hinted at this notion when it noted that the trust,
power, or authority was “inherent” and did not depend on the length of the relation-
ship. However, the Court of Appeal went on to require evidence that consent was
induced through abuse of that relationship, which suggests that more was needed
than mere proof of the trust/authority relationship and the use by the accused of
his employment position to facilitate the sexual activity. The problem with the indu-
cement requirement in this context is that it suggests that her consent can be
abstracted from his position of power—that is, that we can separate instances
where his power induced her consent from those where it did not. In the context
of an institutionalized psychiatric patient and an accused who has power over her
liberty, such a separation is not possible. This causal requirement is also proble-
matic if it requires the complainant to testify explicitly that she agreed to sex
only because of his position of authority. The complainant may well have
thought she did not want the sexual activity to take place at all, as in Alsadi, or
may not be able to express the precise impact of his authority on her actions, par-
ticularly in cases where she has learned that compliance with persons in positions of
power or authority is expected of her.
In my view, the key doctrinal mistake in the approach taken by Alsadi was the
two-step analysis of consent. The trial judge found that consent was present on the
facts and only then went on to determine whether that consent was vitiated by an
abuse of trust, power, or authority. The two-step approach has been applied in
many cases without a discussion of whether it is appropriate.
65
This is contrary
to the plain language of the Criminal Code, which provides that “no consent is
obtained” where she was induced to engage in the activity by the abuse in question.
Both courts in Alsadi applied the section as if it reads “once a finding of consent is
made it can be vitiated where it is induced by the abuse of trust, power or authority.”
One cannot answer the question of whether the complainant consented without
considering the dynamics of trust, power, and authority that bring into doubt a
voluntary agreement to engage in sexual activity. Where there is apparent agreement,
actual consent must be assessed in light of all of the circumstances. It is simply not
possible to make an initial determination of consent without weighing the impact of
the abuse of power, trust, or authority on that determination. Mere agreement by the
complainant to engage in sexual activity is not legal consent.
The two-step approach to consent also puts undue focus on the complainant’s
behaviour in making the initial assessment of consent without considering the
exploitative behaviour of the accused. Did she resist adequately? Did she complain
immediately after the assault? Was there other corroborating physical evidence?
All of these inquiries used by the trial judge to make a determination about
consent were based on stereotypical beliefs about how a complainant should
65. The Court of Appeal in Stender, for example, explicitly recognizes that no consent is present
without voluntariness but still engages in a two-step analysis in parts of the decision.
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respond to sexual assault and failed to consider the accused’s abuse of his position
of power.
66
A two-step approach to consent is not used when applying the other criteria in
section 273.1(2). For example, if the issue were whether the complainant was incap-
able of consent under section 273.1(2)(b), we would not first inquire whether there
was consent and then go on to assess capacity. Similarly, in section 273.1(2)(d),
which states that no consent is present if the complainant expresses a lack of agree-
ment to engage in the sexual activity, we do not ask first whether she consented and
then go on to examine whether she expressed a lack of agreement. Section
273.1(2)(e) is a bit different because it deals with situations where there was
consent to some sexual activity but that consent is revoked before the sexual activity
in question. Even with this subsection, the inquiry into whether there was voluntary
agreement to the sexual activity in question should not first be assessed in isolation
before considering the evidence of revocation. All of the factors in section 273.1(2)
reflect different ways in which no voluntary agreement is present for the sexual
activity in question.
The Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v Lutoslawski makes clear that any apparent
agreement induced by an abuse of trust, power, or authority is not consent:
Section 273.1(2)(c) speaks not only to the abuse of a position of authority
but also to the misuse of a position of power or trust. The section addresses
the kinds of relationships in which an apparent consent to sexual activity
is rendered illusory by the dynamics of the relationship between the
accused and the complainant, and by the misuse of the influence vested
in the accused by virtue of that relationship.
67
The Ontario Court of Appeal in Lutoslawski also noted that “an individual who is in
a position of trust over another may use the personal feelings and confidence engen-
dered by that relationship to secure an apparent consent to sexual activity.”
68
This same two-step approach to consent used by the Alsadi trial judge was taken
by the trial judge in a recent Ontario case, R. v D.T.
69
The complainant in D.T. was a
thirty-three-year-old woman with cerebral palsy who had multiple physical and
mental disabilities. She alleged that she was sexually assaulted over a period of
time by her “favorite uncle” who would visit the complainant when her mother
was out. She testified in direct examination that she said “no,” “stop it,” and
66. The two-step approach is equally inappropriate in the context of section 265(3), which provides
that no consent is obtained where the complainant submits, or does not not resist, by reason of
the exercise of authority. Consent cannot be assessed without considering the exercise of
authority.
67. Lutoslawski, supra note 63 at para 12 [emphasis added].
68. Ibid [emphasis added].
69. R v DT, 2012 ONSC 2166, [2012] OJ No 1720 (SCJ), rev’g (sub nom R v T(D)) 2011 ONCJ 213
(available on CanLII) [DT ONSC].
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“don’t touch” on a number of occasions and that she did not want the sexual activity
to take place. She got confused in cross-examination and appeared to contradict
herself about one particular incident.
70
As a result of this contradiction, the trial
judge had a reasonable doubt about non-consent and only then moved on to
assess whether the accused had abused a position of trust or authority over the com-
plainant. He concluded that the accused had violated a position of trust and that the
accused had “preyed” on the complainant and pressured her to keep all of the events
secret.
The summary conviction appeal court overturned the finding that the accused
had abused a position of trust, power, or authority and acquitted the accused.
71
The importance of the two-step approach was evident:
The analysis only needs to involve a consideration of s. 273.1(2) if the trial
judge has decided there was true consent or has a reasonable doubt as to
true consent after all considerations mentioned above.
72
This statement reveals the fallacy of the two-step approach: one cannot determine
“true consent” without looking at trust, power, and authority. The D.T. summary
conviction appeal court relied on the following passage from R. v Ewanchuk to
reach this conclusion:
Section 265(3) identifies an additional set of circumstances in which the
accused’s conduct will be culpable. The trial judge only has to consult
s. 265(3) in those cases where the complainant has actually chosen to par-
ticipate in sexual activity, or her ambiguous conduct or submission has
given rise to doubt as to the absence of consent. If, as in this case, the com-
plainant’s testimony establishes the absence of consent beyond a reason-
able doubt, the actus reus analysis is complete, and the trial judge
should have turned his attention to the accused’s perception of the encoun-
ter and the question of whether the accused possessed the requisite mens
rea.
73
70. Janine Benedet and I have written about the problems with cross-examination in this case and
others in Janine Benedet and Isabel Grant, “Taking the Stand: Access to Justice for Witnesses
with Mental Disabilities in Sexual Assault Cases” (2013) Osgoode Hall Law Journal
[forthcoming].
71. DT ONSC, supra note 69.
72. Ibid at para 22 [emphasis added].
73. Ibid, citing Ewanchuk, supra note 6 at para 40. Section 265 (3) is a narrower abuse of trust
provision before section 273.1, which applies to all assault offences not just sexual assault. My
argument against a two-step approach to consent applies equally to this section, which makes
clear that “no consent is obtained” if the complainant submits or does not resist due to the
exercise of authority.
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In this passage from Ewanchuk, the Supreme Court of Canada does not say that
there must be a finding of consent before assessing the power relationship. It clearly
uses language other than consent and refers to the complainant choosing to partici-
pate or submit to the sexual activity. This is very different from a finding that there
has been voluntary consent. The Court in Ewanchuk was recognizing that even
where there is an abuse of trust, power, or authority, a woman may still have
said no and it is then not necessary to consider section 273.1(2)(c). While the
Court in Ewanchuk occasionally falls into the language of a two-step approach, it
quickly makes clear that any “consent” is only apparent:
To be legally effective, consent must be freely given. Therefore, even if the
complainant consented, or her conduct raises a reasonable doubt about her
non-consent, circumstances may arise which call into question what factors
prompted her apparent consent. The Code defines a series of conditions
under which the law will deem an absence of consent in cases of
assault, notwithstanding the complainant’s ostensible consent or
participation.
74
The summary conviction appeal judge in D.T. found that, objectively, there was no
position of authority present in the case and that, subjectively, it was not established
that any position of trust led the complainant to submit to the sexual activity: “Once
a reasonable doubt on [non-consent] was created, the record did not disclose any
effect of D.T.’s position upon the response of the complainant to his advances.”
75
There is no question that the two-step inquiry into consent has an impact on the
outcome. The finding of consent shapes how the trust, power, and authority
relationship is construed. In D.T., for example, the appeal judge specifically
stated that it was necessary to explore how the trust relationship impacted the com-
plainant especially because of the reasonable doubt about non-consent.
76
The
finding that the woman consented is used as evidence to prove that she was not
responding to an abuse of trust, power, or authority. The correct inquiry uses
trust, power, and authority to inform an assessment of whether or not there was
consent, not vice versa.
Neither the complainant in Alsadi nor in D.T. was questioned on whether they
felt compelled to submit because of the power the accused had over them,
because they both testified emphatically that they had said no to the sexual activity
and that they did not want it to take place. Yet where do these two cases leave a
complainant who denies consent? Must a woman testify that, yes, she agreed to
sex but only because of the power and authority? A woman who claims she did
not want to have sex at all will have a much harder time establishing an abuse of
74. Ewanchuk, supra note 6 at para 36 [emphasis added].
75. DT ONSC, supra note 69 at para 35.
76. Ibid at para 33.
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trust, power, or authority. It is difficult for a complainant to testify: “I didn’t want
the sexual activity to take place at all but if I did agree I only did so because of the
abuse of trust, power or authority.” It is therefore essential to answer the consent
question only once and to answer it fully informed about the trust, power, or auth-
ority relationship that exists. Of course, if there is adequate other evidence of non-
consent, that evidence should be determinative. However, where there is an appar-
ent agreement to engage in sexual activity, no finding of consent should be made
without considering trust, power, and authority.
77
Conclusion
It is time for the law to recognize that some relationships are so inherently
coercive that a voluntary consent to sexual activity cannot be obtained. I am not
suggesting that women who are civilly committed lose all autonomy over their
sexuality. Rather, I am suggesting that true sexual autonomy cannot exist in the
legal environment of coercion and powerlessness created by civil commitment
and forced treatment. Prohibiting such activity could be done legislatively, but it
also could be developed by the courts. Just because Parliament has not legislated
that civilly committed patients cannot have sex with their caregivers and those
guarding them, it does not mean that there is a parliamentary intention that these
sexual relationships are acceptable. In fact, Parliament has given the courts the
tools they need, through voluntariness and trust, power, and authority to accomplish
this objective.
The obvious criticism of the position taken in this article is that it limits the
sexual autonomy of women who are civilly committed. Why would one want to
further limit the sexual choices of a group of women who have already lost
decision-making autonomy over many aspects of their lives? My response to this
criticism is that real sexual autonomy is promoted by preventing exploitation.
Women cannot make autonomous sexual decisions in an environment where they
are constantly at risk of sexual assault and exploitation. As Janine Benedet and I
have argued elsewhere, protecting women from abuse and exploitation is essential
to, rather than in tension with, promoting women’s sexual autonomy.
78
This is not
to suggest that women who are civilly committed cannot consent to sexual activity
77. There is a third way this case could have been argued to reach the same result. Section 273.1(2)(b)
provides that no consent is obtained where the complainant is “incapable of consenting to the
activity.” Janine Benedet and I have argued elsewhere that capacity to consent should be
assessed contextually and should focus not only on the limitations of the complainant but also
on any power imbalance between the complainant and the accused in the particular context of
the case. Benedet and Grant, “A Situational Approach to Incapacity,” supra note 7. The Crown
in Alsadi conceded that the complainant had the capacity to consent to sexual activity because
she had a boyfriend. Such a concession assumes that being capable of consenting to one
person means one is capable of consenting to everyone. In fact, capacity to consent is person,
time, and relationship specific. See, for example, R v C, [2009] UKHL 42, [2009] 1 WLR 1786.
78. Benedet and Grant, “Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief,” supra note 7.
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with anyone. My argument is simply that people who control the liberty and secur-
ity of others through the coercive power of the state should not be able to use that
advantage to seek out powerless women for sex. When they do so, it is impossible
to separate such coercive power from any agreement conveyed by the complainant.
To the extent that this position may limit a woman’s freedom to choose sexual
activity with those responsible for controlling her liberty and security, I argue
that it is worth this potential cost if it prevents sexual exploitation and facilitates
women in institutions making safe and non-coerced decisions about whether and
with whom to engage in sexual activity.
This case demonstrates an alarming disregard of context in a case where context
was crucial. No finding of consent can be made without addressing the fact that the
complainant was detained under the force of law and that the accused was employed
to help restrain her liberty and, ostensibly, to protect her. A two-step approach that
asks whether consent is present and only then examines the context of trust, power,
and authority is an impoverished version of consent. We must be vigilant against
allowing the reintroduction of stereotypes about “over-sexed” women with psychia-
tric disabilities that mask the profound abuse of power that is evident in these sexual
relationships. As long as society continues to detain people against their will, the
law must recognize that the sexual exploitation of detained individuals by those
charged with their care and protection is sexual assault. Failure to do so sends
the message to those in positions of power that they can have sexual access to
these women with impunity.
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